Labor market equilibrium

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Table of contents

1 General Introduction 
1.1 Empirical analysis of two labor market policies
1.1.1 Anonymous applications
1.1.2 Unemployment insurance
1.2 Methodological issues for labor market policy evaluation
1.2.1 Placebo effects
1.2.2 Differential sample attrition
1.2.3 Equilibrium effects
2 Do anonymous resumes make the battlefield more even? Evidence from a randomized field experiment 
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Previous literature
2.3 Theoretical insights
2.3.1 Environment
2.3.2 When resumes are nominative
2.3.3 When resumes are made anonymous
2.4 Experimental design
2.5 Data
2.6 Measuring applicants’ risk of discrimination
2.7 Representativeness of firms entering the experiment
2.8 Impact of anonymous resumes on applicants
2.8.1 Overall impact
2.8.2 Heterogeneous effects
2.9 Impact of anonymous resumes from the recruiter perspective
2.9.1 Crowding out effects
2.9.2 Costs
2.9.3 Benefits
2.10 Appendix : complementary tables
3 The Effect of Potential Unemployment Benefits Duration on Un-employment Exits to Work and on Match Quality in France 
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Previous literature
3.3 Institutional background
3.4 The data
3.5 Identification strategy
3.5.1 Sample features that plea against precise manipulation
3.5.2 Testing discontinuities in the forcing variable distribution
3.5.3 Testing discontinuities in covariates distributions around the threshold
3.6 The effect of potential benefit duration on unemployment exits to work
3.6.1 Estimating an overall effect of UI generosity on hazard rates
3.6.2 Estimating the effect of UI generosity on the dynamics of exits to job
3.6.3 Robustness : estimating the effect of UI generosity on non employment duration
3.7 The Effect of potential benefit duration on match quality
3.7.1 Selection into employment
3.7.2 Effects on the first job when leaving unemployment registers
3.7.3 Effects 2 years after unemployment entry
3.8 Conclusion
3.9 Appendix A: Employment-unemployment registers
3.10 Appendix B: Fuzzy design
3.11 Appendix C: Robustness
4 Non-response bias in treatment effect models 
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Sample selection correction using number of calls
4.2.1 Framework and notations
4.2.2 Number of calls as a substitute to instruments
4.2.3 Restrictions implied by the latent variable model
4.2.4 Discreteness of the number of calls
4.2.5 Comparison with bounding approaches
4.3 Application
4.3.1 The program and the data
4.3.2 Selection correction
4.4 Conclusion
4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Proofs of propositions in the text
4.5.2 Estimation and inference of the truncation model
4.5.3 Extension to non compliance
4.5.4 Adjustment of Lee (2009) bounds when the outcome is binary
5 Labor Market Policy Evaluation in Equilibrium: Some Lessons of the Job Search and Matching Model 
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The model
5.2.1 Job creation
5.2.2 The impact of counseling when wages are exogenous
5.2.3 Wage bargaining
5.2.4 Labor market equilibrium
5.2.5 The impact of counseling on labor market equilibrium with endogenous wages
5.3 Policy evaluation in steady state
5.3.1 Calibration
5.3.2 Policy experiment
5.4 Policy evaluation and dynamic adjustment
5.4.1 Permanent policy
5.4.2 Transitory policy
5.5 Conclusion
Bibliography