FISH PRODUCTION, MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND FISHING PROBLEMS IN SUDAN .

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INTRODUCTION

Fisheries in developing countries are experiencing serious over-harvesting stress and often consequent collapse of fish resource stocks due to many market and policy failure situations such as poor management and open access conditions (Andrew et al. 2007; Sterner, 2003). The number of under-harvested inland fish stocks has decreased from 40 % in 1990 to 23 % in 2004 (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). This was mainly driven by the rapid increase in fish consumption, which has doubled in developing countries in the past three decades due to increase in population (MEA, 2005). On the other hand, the growth in the international fish trade (exporting fish from developing to developed countries) increases the price of fish on local markets due to demand from exporters. This therefore results in illegally-caught fish entering markets due to increasing consumer demand that is met by increasing production, putting serious pressure on fish stocks (DFID 2005; Policy Brief 7). Particularly, African tropical fresh water lakes are believed to be fully exploited and even over-fished in many parts (MEA, 2005). This presents a big threat to the capacity of these fishery ecosystems to continue providing for the livelihood of many communities that are highly dependent on them (FAO, 1999a; UNEP, 2010; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Inland fisheries in Africa, however, remain of significant importance in terms of their potential to contribute to provision of employment, improved nutrition, poverty reduction, and food security (FAO, 1999a; FAO, 2009; UNEP, 2010). Africa contributed 25 % of the global inland fish catch of 10 million tons in 2008 (FAO, 2009; UNEP, 2010) and it is estimated that over 200 million Africans consume fish on a regular basis (Heck et al. 2007). Despite its high importance, most African countries lack essential statistics on the current status and potential contribution of fishery resources to livelihoods and food security (World Fish Centre, 2003).
The stress on tropical fresh water fisheries is worsened by the practice of illegal fishing and noncompliance with regulations, which has serious consequences in most of these regions. The
practice of illegal fishing, particularly the use of small mesh sizes in an already over-fished resource, will undoubtedly lead to stock collapse and fishery closure. It removes small fish before they can finish their life span and hence limits the opportunity for reproduction (Clark, 1990).
This calls for urgent action to reduce noncompliance with fishery regulations, especially the use of small mesh sizes in these regions. Noncompliance with regulations on the continent also contributes to lack of accurate statistics about the status and potential role of fishery resources both at local and national levels (World Fish Centre, 2003). It is believed that the actual catch from inland water is 2-3 times larger than what is reported in official statistics due to illegal fishing and noncompliance with regulations, especially in the artisanal systems predominant in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (FA0, 2003; Welcomme et al. 2010). Failure to account for illegal fishing therefore gives incorrect estimates of the resource and misleads fishery policy formulation and management decisions based on this information (Hatcher and Pascoe, 2006, Atta-mills et al, 2004). Achieving compliance with fishery regulations is accordingly becoming an issue of serious concern to managers and policy makers worldwide and especially in the tropical freshwater fisheries of SSA.
Studies show that noncompliance with mesh size regulation is very common in Africa driven by the motive of maximising harvest from open access fishing waters and the difficulties associated with enforcing regulations, seriously affecting fishery resources on the continent (Akpalu, 2008a, 2009; Eggert and Lokina, 2010). Sudan is no exception and is experiencing the same pressures of stock declines and over-fishing as a result of noncompliance with mesh size regulation, especially in Jebel Aulia Reservoir (JAR) (FAO, 2008; FAO 1999b).

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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
1.3 HYPOTHESES
1.4 APPROACH OF THE STUDY
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS.
CHAPTER TOW FISH PRODUCTION, MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND FISHING PROBLEMS IN
SUDAN .
2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.2 FISH PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION PATTERNS IN SUDAN
2.3 FISHERY POLICIES, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN SUDAN
2.4 STATUS OF THE FISHERY AND PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL FISHING IN JEBEL AULIA
2.5 SUMMARY
CHAPTER THREE.. RELEVANT LITERATURE ON MEASURING NONCOMPLIANCE WITH FISHERY REGULATIONS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.2 APPROACHES AND METHODS USED IN COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS
3. 3 SUMMARY
CHAPTER FOUR  DYNAMIC DETERRENCE OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH FISHERY REGULATIONS: THE ADAPTED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS WITH FREQUENCY AS THE MEASURE OF VIOLATION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.2 DYNAMIC DETERRENCE WITH FREQUENCY MEASURES OF VIOLATION RATE
4.3 THE EFFECT OF KEY DETERMINING FACTORS ON THE OPTIMAL VIOLATION RATE
4.4 SUMMARY
CHAPTER FIVE . DETERMINANTS OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH FISHERY REGULATIONS IN
SUDAN’S ARTISANAL FISHERY .
5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.2 EXTENSIONS INTRODUCED TO THE STANDARD DDM FRAMEWORK
5.3 EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE ADAPTED MODEL TO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATIONS IN SUDAN
5.4 STUDY AREA AND SOURCES OF DATA
5.5 MODEL VARIABLES AND ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION
5.6 DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.7 SUMMARY
CHAPTER SIX  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY
REFERENCES .

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