INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND INTELLIGENCE

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CHAPTER 3 IMPERATIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE CO-OPERATION

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, a short overview is provided of the change in the focus and priorities of intelligence with reference to the periods following the end of the Cold War and the watershed events of 11 September 2001, respectively.
The international obligations in the various conventions and resolutions of the UN Security Council; the AU; SADC and ASEAN pertaining to international information sharing and cooperation in respect of special investigative techniques, are furthermore discussed in this chapter. Drivers for intelligence cooperation and intelligence sharing, such as globalisation, the value-for-money concept, and the enrichment of intelligence, are discussed. The focus of intelligence during the post-Cold War era is dealt with first.

THE CHANGE IN INTELLIGENCE FOCUS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The intelligence focus during the Cold War era was mainly a military one between the Western and Soviet power blocs. A major intelligence failure in the US was insufficient intelligence warning of the impending collapse of the Soviet Union: ―What is clear is that an agency that had spent the last 40 years primarily on trying to discern the intentions of the Soviet Union and its leaders had overestimated the strength of the Soviet economy‖ (Green, 2005: 37). One of the post-Cold War failures relating to Iraq‘s WMD, is ascribed to institutional bias of collectors to share operational information with analysts (Green, 2005: 45). The intelligence strategy of the US reflects the trend in the change in priorities, to the combating of terrorism and to prevent and counter the spread of WMD, for example in the National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America (US, 2005(b)). In addition to refocused strategic objectives various institutional or ‗enterprise objectives‘ are also stated, such as the optimisation of collection capabilities, improved access to intelligence by the IC and customers, and to establish new and strengthen existing foreign intelligence relationships (US, 2005(b): 4, 5). There is furthermore a strong move towards an ‗integrated intelligence enterprise‘ with a new information sharing model where, for instance the generally accepted, but outdated ‗need-to-know principle‘ is substituted by the principle of ‗responsibility to provide‘, reflected in the United States Intelligence Community: Information Sharing Strategy (US, 2008(a): 7, 9).
In the post-Cold War era the IC had to re-establish itself in respect of new focus areas. Rimington, a previous Director General of the British Security Service reflected upon the ‗certainties of the Cold War and the state of flux‘ in which intelligence agencies were finding themselves thereafter (Rimington, 1994). Throughout the post-Cold War period the IC seems to have been searching for a reason to exist (Green, 2005: 47).
Way before the 11 September 2001 events, terrorism and proliferation matters were identified as a substitute for the void left by the end of the Cold War (Rimington, 1994). In the US there were indicators that the intelligence system was at cross-roads before 2001, with numerous deficiencies, identified (Hulnick, 1999: 1), and the future role of intelligence in respect of drug trafficking, organised crime, terrorism and crimes related to WMD already then laid out (Hulnick, 1999: Chapter 6)
Failures by the IC to prevent and manage conflicts in the post-Cold War era, such as that in Somalia, Bosnia and the genocide in Rwanda, highlighted the critical need for strengthening prevention mechanisms such as Early Warning Systems which could support early action. Numerous governmental and non-governmental bodies consequently became involved in early warning (Wane, 2008: 4). The example of the AU will be dealt with later on in this chapter. The post-11 September 2001, developments in the US set the scene for more focused intelligence cooperation, especially intelligence and information sharing.

THE EFFECT OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 EVENTS ON THE FOCUS OF INTELLIGENCE

The events of 11 September 2001, as well as the intelligence failures in respect of WMD in Iraq, played a major part in the focus of the IC on terrorism and WMD. Few single events in history had such a major impact on intelligence cooperation and sharing on all levels, as the 11 September 2001 events.
Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation expanded considerably after both the 11 September 2001 events and the bomb attack in Madrid 911 days thereafter. Additional Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft (used to perform airborne surveillance, and command, control and communications functions for both tactical and air defence forces), were provided by Europe to assist with the protection of the US, which allowed the US to release American aircraft for duty elsewhere. Europol was designated as a central point for data exchange between European law enforcement agencies and the US (Aldridge, 2004: 731).
Although the 11 September events led to huge internal improvements in intelligence cooperation and sharing in the US, the most important paradigm shift emanated from the realisation that the US needs partners in a protracted war on terrorism with a global reach. Furthermore, it was realised that the Achilles heel of US intelligence, despite its technological capabilities regarding imagery and interception, is the need for the country to be assisted by smaller intelligence agencies with HUMINT capabilities. The US even experienced a lack of interpreters in foreign languages (Reveron, 2006: 454). The US realised it could provide training and other assistance to foreign agencies, in exchange for HUMINT, intelligence sharing or being allowed to use foreign territory for surveillance, rather than having to develop HUMINT capabilities (Reveron, 2006: 455).
In South-East Asia the 11 September 2001 events marked the passage of the post-Cold War era. Before those events the regional security issues were dominated by domestic instability with spill-over potential such as in Indonesia, the South China Sea crisis and various territorial disputes in the region (Acharya, 2003: 1). After the 11 September 2001 events, the threat of international terrorism became the focus of security attention, although the other threats did not disappear. South-East Asia has been termed as the ‗second front‘ in the global war on terror (Acharya, 2003: 2, 3). The US engagement in South-East Asia had been marginal and uncertain prior to the 11 September 2001 events. The region now enjoys a higher priority in US strategic thinking, although the ―US re-engagement in South-East Asia is not comparable to that in India, Pakistan or in Central Asia‖ (Acharya, 2003: 5).
Recognition of new threats in terms of crime in the region is not limited to terrorism. During the opening of a regional police chiefs meeting (ASEANAPOL), it was mentioned that ―a new form of war with non-conventional threats such as terrorism, the illegal trade in narcotics, trade in human beings, crimes connected with money-laundering and other forms of transnational crime‖ requires the creation of security through intelligence exchange. This observation was made with reference to the post-Cold War era, and following the 11 September 2001 events and the Bali bombing (Bali News, 2005).
The global response to the 11 September 2001 events is reflected in national counter-terrorism legislation adopted in numerous countries, various resolutions of the UN Security Council and the global strengthening of measures to combat terrorism.
On an institutional level, law enforcement agencies acquired extensive overseas missions whilst intelligence agencies also focus on illegal activities abroad, despite the fact that law enforcement and intelligence communities operated in ―fundamentally dissimilar manners retaining different legal authorities, internal modes of organisation, and governing paradigms‖ (US, 2001: 2).
It is important to determine the nature of international obligations for intelligence cooperation, as well as other, more practical imperatives, drivers or incentives for intelligence cooperation. In this regard global obligations are most important and are dealt with next.

INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

Universal obligations form the highest order of international obligations, namely those obligations which are generally applicable to basically all states or at least all the Member States of the UN.

Universal obligations

The first category of obligations consists of resolutions of the UN Security Council, which are of a binding nature.

United Nations

Resolution 1373/2001 of the UN Security Council was adopted within days of the 11 September 2001 events. It inter alia calls upon all states to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, in particular information regarding the following: (UN, 2001(b): 3)
—Actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks;
—forged or falsified travel documents;
—traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials;
—use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and
—the threat posed by the possession of WMD by terrorist groups.
The Resolution furthermore calls for the exchange of information in accordance with international and domestic law and to cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, and to cooperate through bilateral and multilateral arrangements to prevent and suppress terrorist acts and to take action against the perpetrators of such acts (UN, 2001(b): 3).
Resolution 1540(2004) of the UN Security Council which deals with measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD, is not specific in respect of information exchange, but calls upon states to promote cooperation on nonproliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and to take ‗cooperative action‘ to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials (UN, 2004(b): 4). The language in respect of intelligence cooperation in the two Resolutions is rather weak, and by simply ‗calling‘ upon States does not seem to place a specific obligation on States.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH THEME
2. STUDY OBJECTIVES
3. LITERATURE SURVEY
4. IDENTIFICATION AND DEMARCATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
5. METHODOLOGY
6. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH
CHAPTER 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND INTELLIGENCE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1. INTRODUCTION
2. INTERNATIONAL CRIME
3. COMBATING OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME
4. INTELLIGENCE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
5. INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION
6. CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 3 IMPERATIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE CO-OPERATION
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE CHANGE IN INTELLIGENCE FOCUS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
3. THE EFFECT OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 EVENTS ON THE FOCUS OF INTELLIGENCE
4. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION
5. OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION
6. DRIVERS OF INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION
7. CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 4 CHALLENGES FOR COOPERATION: CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
1. INTRODUCTION
2. SOVEREIGNTY
3. NATIONAL INTERAGENCY RIVALRY/ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE CHALLENGES
4. TECHNICAL ADVANCES AND GLOBALISATION
5. MISTRUST
6. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE
7. RISE OF PRIVATE INTELLIGENCE AND PRIVATE SECURITY
8. DIFFERENT OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS OF CIVILIAN AND LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE
9. CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 5: INTELLIGENCE METHODOLOGIES OF CRIME INTELLIGENCE AND POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE: COMMON GROUND
1. INTRODUCTION
2. INTELLIGENCE METHODOLOGY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
3. METHODOLOGY USED BY POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
4. CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 6 MODELS FOR INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION ON NATIONAL (INTERAGENCY) LEVEL
1. INTRODUCTION
2. CASE STUDY OF THE INTELLIGENCE MODEL IN THE UNITED STATES POST-11 SEPTEMBER 2001
3. CHANGING ROLE OF CIVILIAN AND CRIME INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND ORGANISED CRIME
4. CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 7 MODELS FOR INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION ON THE REGIONAL LEVEL
1. INTRODUCTION
2. INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION: THE EUROPEAN POLICE OFFICE MODEL
3. INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION: THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN CHIEFS OF POLICE MODEL
4. CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT
5. REGIONAL POLICE AND CRIME INTELLIGENCE CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA
6. CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 8 MODELS FOR INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION ON INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
1. INTRODUCTION
2. CRIME INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION MODEL
3.UNITED NATIONS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND COOPERATION
4. CONCLUSION `
CHAPTER 9 EVALUATION
1. SUMMARY
2. TESTING OF ASSUMPTIONS AGAINST STUDY
3. CONCLUSION
ANNEXURE 
SUMMARY 
OPSOMMING 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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