POLITICAL TRANSITION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: ‘WIND OF CHANGE’ BUT NO CHANGE

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CHAPTER III POLITICAL TRANSITION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: ‘WIND OF CHANGE’ BUT NO CHANGE

Introduction

On 6 November 1982 Cameroon’s first head of state stepped down and voluntarily handed over the reins of power to his constitutional successor Paul Biya (Bayart 2009; Mbembe 2001; Akoko 2004; Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003). According to Delancy (1989, p. 65), “not only have voluntary surrenders of power been rare in modern African politics, but there had been no hints within Cameroon that President Ahidjo was contemplating giving up any of his powers.” This feat by Ahidjo was quite unprecedented and followed a similar act two years earlier by Senegalese President Leopold Senghor (Takougang & Krieger, 1998).
Despite leaving the presidency, Ahidjo did not resign as chairman of the Cameroon National Union (CNU) party, from where he hoped to control the levers of the state and his constitutional successor by proxy. According to Delancy (1989, p. 66); “Ahidjo created Biya as a political actor, trained him and groomed him.” To buttress this point, he argues that upon returning to Cameroon in 1962 from university in France, Biya was immediately absorbed into the civil service, became a cabinet minister in 1968, served in various capacities at the presidency until 1975 and thereafter was appointed Prime Minister.
A constitutional amendment in 1979 shifted succession at the helm of the state from the president of the National Assembly to the Prime Minister. Accordingly, “Ahidjo had put in place a skilled technocrat, a man with no political following of his own, no base of support other than Ahidjo’s patronage” (Delancy 1989, p. 66). This was likely the case in the immediate aftermath of Ahidjo’s resignation. However, as he was to find out to his peril not only was Biya no stooge, but his accession to power was an opportunity for the “elites of the central-southern region of the country, [who] allowed a northerner to take power in 1958, [to] recover it with obvious satisfaction in 1982” (Bayart, 2009, pp. 194-5).
Cameroon’s new president was not only given the keys to the state on a gold platter, but by various accounts inherited a healthy economy (Amin 2011, Takougang & Krieger, 1998 and Nkwi 1997) At the time Cameroon’s economy had a number of advantages including an extensive territory, favourable climate and fertile soils which enabled it to produce food crops for local consumption and cash crops for export. The country also experienced minimal population pressure and a stable, albeit authoritarian government which “maintained a stable economy [and] by the end of the 1970s was amongst the structurally best balanced in Africa” (Rambousek, 1982, p. 167). For example, between 1978 and 1985 Cameroon’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) witnessed an annual growth rate of 10% placing it amongst the countries with the highest per capita income growth in 1986 (Diduk, 1992, p. 205).
The hikes in the price of oil on the world market in the 1970s led to an increase in government revenues, occasioning a positive net effect on the economy. For example, from 1970 to 1985 the economy witnessed an annual growth rate of over 7% (Page, 2002), and an external debt of around US$2.3 billion in 1982 (Takougang & Krieger, 1998). This growth was aided in part by the discovery of oil in the 1970s, and commercial production effectively took off in 1978 and accelerated to its peak in the 1980s. Petroleum therefore became a pivotal element in Cameroon’s economy (Delancy, 1989).
The importance of crude oil could be measured by the following figures. In 1977 cash crops contributed 71.9% of state revenue as against 1.4% for oil. However, by 1985 cash crops contributed 21.4% of state revenue against 65.4% for oil (Page, 2002, p. 44). At the time it was fashionable to “sterilise the windfall by allocating it in special development accounts” (Auty, 1988, p. 148). These special accounts, known in Cameroon as compte hors budget, were mostly held in foreign banks, and were meant to store oil funds and accumulate profits to be reinvested in the domestic economy (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). In principle, the injection of oil money into the economy was to be aimed at boosting local investment and consumption patterns by the state and the private sector. These investments were to be directed at vital sectors of the economy such as infrastructural development, notably roads, railways, electricity etc. On the other hand, oil windfalls was also used to stabilise prices and control the exchange rate.
Unlike the situation in neighbouring countries such as Gabon and Nigeria, where oil windfalls witnessed ‘rapid domestic absorption’ into the national economy, the Cameroon government under Ahidjo deliberately downplayed urges for ‘rapid absorption’ by not publicly disclosing the true figures, thereby avoiding a ‘boom mentality’ (Delancy, 1989). Ahidjo’s frugal management of the economy earned Cameroon the reputation for “sound macroeconomic management and exemplary windfall deployment” (Auty, 1988, p. 149). However, in the 1980s a combination of internal and external circumstances undermined this positive growth trend. This caused a downturn in the economy and subsequently an economic crisis (Amin, 2011). According to Mbembe (2001, p. 49), “the fall in prices of cash and subsistence crops aided by the economic slowdown accelerated at the same time that the erosion of external financial reserves worsened.”
This chapter seeks to demonstrate how the economic crisis that affected Cameroon from the mid-1980s to the late-1990s wrought profound changes in the national economy and occasioned tectonic movements on the political landscape. The mutations that occurred in Cameroon during this period were not without external interventions from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Like elsewhere in Africa, both institutions imposed one-size-fits-all structural adjustment programmes (SAP) designed to kick-start the Cameroon economy and align it with the prevailing neoliberal trend. On the other hand, donors pushed for governance reform which was thought to be a panacea to the challenges facing Cameroon as it navigated the treacherous ‘second wind of change’ that swept across the African continent in the 1990s (Southall, 2003).
At the time, it was generally believed that change on the economic and political fronts was imperative. However, unlike in Taiwan and South Korea where economic changes preceded and partly led political changes (Ottaway, 1997), events in Cameroon were not only dictated by external agendas, but other local, mainly political, elements also came into the fray. The outcome was half-baked economic reform and the politicisation of democratic reforms. In terms of the latter, i.e. decentralisation, I argue here that the elite in Cameroon faced mounting unpopularity caused by economic mismanagement, corruption and political inertia. This elite, some of whom had by the 1990s been shuttling around the state apparatus since independence “could no longer justify its stay in power much less its monopoly of power” (Mentan, 1998, p. 43).
The elite feared that succumbing to the people’s demands for change would mean political suicide, as was the case with the regimes of Hastings Kamuzu Banda in Malawi, Moussa Traoré in Mali, and Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, among others (van de Walle 1997 and Wiseman 1996). This chapter therefore argues that lacking legitimacy because of its failed promises of economic improvement and political liberalisation, the ruling elite in Cameroon successfully thwarted opposition demands for a ‘sovereign’ national conference to discuss constitutional reform and orchestrated what some describe as a façade of meaningless cosmetic changes that enabled them to remain in power to the present.

The Political Economy of Cameroon from the 1980s to the 1990s

As noted earlier, the relationship between Ahidjo and Biya was quite cordial in the immediate aftermath of the former’s resignation in 1982. In January 1983, Ahidjo dismissed four members of the CNU for alleged insubordination to Biya. Later that year both men embarked on tours around the country in a show of unity (Takougang & Krieger, 1998). When French President François Mitterrand visited Cameroon in 1983 both men paid a courtesy visit to Ahidjo in Garoua. Prior to this visit, Biya moved to stamp his authority at the helm of the state by conducting a cabinet reshuffle that witnessed the dismissal of some Ahidjo acolytes (Delancy, 1989). This move was quite significant because it indicated that Biya was gradually asserting his authority, albeit in the government and not the party where Ahidjo was very much in command.
The descent to hell for Ahidjo began in August 1983 when President Biya announced the discovery of a plot against his government that implicated Ahidjo. This announcement marked the unravelling of a chain of events that culminated in a putsch in 1984 which was put down by loyal elements in the army. This was followed by summary trials of alleged plotters, including Ahidjo, who at the time was in exile in France. Many co-conspirators were found guilty and some were sentenced to death and executed. Other death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment, including that handed down to Ahidjo (Takougang and Krieger 1998 and Mbembe 2001). According to Bayart (2009, pp. 150-151): “The patrimonialist recuperation of the state which had been attempted by Ahidjo between January and June 1983 in his desire to assure the supremacy of the party over the Presidency of the Republic had failed.” The abortive coup in 1984 therefore “provided Biya the opportunity to remove from office a number of ministers, bureaucrats and politicians who were closely associated with the Ahidjo regime or whose loyalties to the new regime were suspect” (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003, p. 7).
After successfully neutralising the perceived threat to his rule, Biya set-out to consolidate himself at the helm of the state. It was therefore with renewed vigour that he announced the next scheduled congress of the Cameroon National Union in Bamenda (Delancy, 1989). He used this occasion to announce the dissolution of the CNU and the birth of the Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement. Biya launched his vision for the country under the banner of a ‘New Deal’ and later fleshed it out in a book: Communal Liberalism (1987). Biya’s vision of communal liberalism entailed the emergence of a new political society and national culture, the promotion of economic development, social justice and human dignity. Within this framework, he pressed for continuation of the one-party system with the CPDM serving as a school for democracy until the country would be in a position to face the complexities of political pluralism (Biya, 1987).
In a remarkable departure from what obtained under Ahidjo and the CNU, the CPDM ‘democratic canopy’ in 1986 allowed a plurality of candidates to vie for positions in the basic organs of the party. Next came open competition for local council elections in 1987, followed by multiple candidates for elections to the National Assembly in 1988 (Mentan, 1998). Added to this was the president’s promise of open and accountable governance, zero tolerance for corruption and illicit enrichment and enabling conditions for all citizens “to participate fully and effectively in governance and the economy” (Mbuagbo & Akoko, 2004, p. 256).
These overtures were an attempt by a new president to win popular support. On the other hand, such hyperbole could be viewed as foresighted attempts to head off an impending storm. Biya’s rhetoric also had the unintended consequence of rekindling nostalgia among some segments of the single party for the good old days of multiparty competition. For Anglophones, it wetted appetites for a return to open electoral competitions reminiscent of what obtained in the late 1950s and early 1960s before the reunification of Cameroon. According to Mentan (1998, p. 43); “the entire experience did prepare Cameroonians for the real thing which became a categorical imperative in 1990.” Prior to the above-mentioned ‘categorical imperative’, the economic situation in Cameroon took a turn for the worse and, as noted earlier, it had both internal and external dimensions.
In the years following independence, economic development in Africa was largely driven by the state. In Cameroon, Presidents Ahidjo and Biya based economic development on state planning (Delancy, 1989). Economic development under Ahidjo was encapsulated in the term ‘planned liberalism.’ This placed emphasis on the promotion of agriculture and industry and also the creation of parastatals and other public corporations (Gabriel, 1999). The state therefore assumed a pivotal position in economic development over and above the local private investor class which was dominated by French interests amounting to roughly two-thirds in 1984 (Mentan, 2011, p. 31).
Economic planning by the state also took the form of five year plans. The first three sets of plans (1960–1965; 1966–1971 and 1972-1975) focused on industrial and infrastructural development, as well as on food crop production (Nkwi, 1997). The fourth plan (1976-1981) placed emphasis on the development of agriculture and agro-industries. The fifth plan (1981-1986) came at a time when oil constituted a significant revenue earner for the country and was marked by the intensification of agriculture and rural projects. The sixth plan (1986-1991) was the first to be drafted under Biya and it envisaged the construction of new housing, extension of electricity services to urban and rural areas, promotion of private land ownership, laying the foundations of a social security programme and development of a preventive healthcare system (Delancy, 1989). As elaborated upon subsequently, the onset of the economic crisis in the mid-1980s disrupted the government’s ambitious schemes, including the sixth development plan.
State-run parastatals and public corporations constituted a highly lucrative sector of the economy that developed during the Ahidjo period and continued into the Biya era. The preponderance of parastatals could be seen in vital sectors such as industry, agriculture, transport and utilities. However, a number of these entities were poorly conceived, badly managed and became prime sources of corruption that enabled state officials to accumulate wealth by enriching themselves at the public expense (Gabriel, 1999).
A prime example of an ill-conceived agro-industrial project was the rice development corporation or Societe d’expansion et de modernisation de la riziculture de Yagoua (Semry). Conceived of as part of President Ahidjo’s ‘Green Revolution’ campaign, Semry was a capital-intensive integrated rice production scheme located in the semi-arid North of Cameroon (Delancy, 1989). This project received the financial backing of the French government, the World Bank and the European Economic Community (EEC). The project was earmarked as a scheme to modernise the country’s agricultural sector and ensure food self-sufficiency. It was also aimed at positioning Cameroon as a major producer of rice which, according to van de Walle (1989), was unimportant for local diets and absent from farming practices. However, Semry’s operation was undermined by cheap rice imported from Asia. Paradoxically, the majority of rice importers at the time were from the North of the country. This further weakened what was already a futile attempt at local ‘development’ in their home area. It was also alleged that, when Biya took over as president, he looked the other way while ‘fraudulent rice’ was imported into the country, further compromising Semry. To confound things even further, Semry was placed under the Ministry of Industrial and Commercial Development rather than the ministry of Agriculture which, according to van de Walle (1989, p. 596), was ‘corrupt because of rent-seeking activities.’
Another example of an overly ambitious agro-industrial scheme was the Wheat Development Corporation, or Société pour le Développement de la culture du Blé (SODEBLE). Under the fourth Development Plan (1976-81), Cameroonian authorities envisaged the mass production of wheat. It was hoped that local production of wheat would meet the needs of Cameroon and save the country millions of Francs CFA¹ from wheat imports. Oblivious to the fact that Cameroon’s climate was not suitable for wheat production and also to the absence of suitable seed varieties at the time, SODEBLE was created and allocated 50,000 hectares for growing wheat with an expected yield of 125,000 metric tons per year. However, by 1983 only 600 hectares were planted and 900 tons produced (Delancy, 1989, p. 120).
In the domain of industrial production, ill-conceived schemes had no better track records than the agro-industrial projects. For example, in 1976 a fertilizer factory, Societe Camerounaise des Engrais (SOCAME), was established, shut down in 1977 and reopened shortly afterwards before closing again in 1981 due to very high maintenance costs. In 1980 a paper and pulp factory Cellulose du Cameroun (CELLUCAM) became operational, but went bankrupt in 1983. According to Delancy (1989, p. 133), CELLUCAM’s bankruptcy stemmed from the fact that its products were expected to be “sold at $800 per ton with a break-even price of $450. But when production began, the selling price for paper was $300 per ton.” Other ambitious projects, including Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), Aluminium and Iron and Steel plants among others, were also envisaged (Auty, 1988). However, the onset of economic crisis saw these projects scaled down or scrapped entirely.

ABSTRACT 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.
TABLE OF CONTENTS .
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION AND METHODS
1.1 CONTEXTUALISING DECENTRALISATION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN CAMEROON
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION .
1.4.1 Working questions .
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW .
1.6 RESEARCH METHODS .
1.6.1 Preliminaries
1.6.2 Bali
1.6.3 Mbankomo
1.7 CHAPTER OUTLINE
CHAPTER II CAMEROON: FROM MANDATE TO INDEPENDENCE & REUNIFICATION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.2 FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY IN AFRICA
2.2.1 Assimilation to Association .
2.2.2 Traditional Chiefs as ‘Administrative Auxiliaries’ in French Cameroon
2.3 THE BRITISH MANDATE IN CAMEROON
2.3.1 Native Authorities in the Southern Cameroons
2.4 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN CAMEROONS
2.4.1 Educated Elite vs. ‘illiterate’ Traditional Chiefs
2.5 THE PATH TO INDEPENDENCE IN THE SOUTHERN CAMEROONS .
2.6 AHMADOU AHIDJO AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN EAST CAMEROON
2.7 PLEBISCITE AND REUNIFICATION IN THE SOUTHERN CAMEROONS
2.8 THE FUMBAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE
2.9 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER III POLITICAL TRANSITION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: ‘WIND OF CHANGE’ BUT NO CHANGE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.2 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CAMEROON FROM THE 1980S TO THE 1990S
3.3 ECONOMIC (MIS)-MANAGEMENT AND MELTDOWN
3.4 ECONOMIC CRISIS, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND POLITICAL IMPASSE .
3.5 POLITICAL TURBULENCE AND ‘GOVERNANCE’ REFORMS
3.6 POLITICAL REFORM IN CAMEROON: ‘WIND OF CHANGE’ BUT NO CHANGE
3.7 PEOPLE VS. POWER I
3.8 PEOPLE VS. POWER II
3.9 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
CHAPTER IV SELF-RELIANCE IN ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON: THE BALI COMMUNITY WATER PROJECT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.2 BACKGROUND
4.3 BALI UNDER GERMAN COLONIALISM
4.4 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE PARTITION OF KAMERUN
4.5 WIDEKUM ACTION AGAINST BALI
4.6 SELF-HELP IN ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON: THE BALI COMMUNITY WATER PROJECT
4.7 ‘MODERNISATION’ AND EXPANSION OF BALI’S WATER SUPPLY: ENTER SNEC.
4.8 BUILD-UP TO THE REVOLT AGAINST SNEC IN BALI .
4.9 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
CHAPTER V LAND TENURE AND INTER-COMMUNITY POLITICS: THE PERILS OF MUNICIPAL PLANNING IN BALI
5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.2 BACKGROUND
5.3 LAND TENURE AND TRADITIONAL LAND-USE PRACTICES
5.4 CHANGING LAND-USE PATTERNS IN THE GRASSFIELDS
5.5 TIMELINE OF ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN BALI AND BAWOCK, 1970-2007 .
5.6 PARTITION AND ANNEXATION OF MANTUM VILLAGE
5.7 INTER-COMMUNAL POLITICS IN BALI: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
5.8 CONCLUSION .
CHAPTER VI ‘WRATH FROM THE GODS:’ TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ELECTORAL POLITICS IN BALI
6.1 INTRODUCTION
6.2 BACKGROUND
6.3 DÉMOCRATIE AVANCÉE IN CAMEROON AND PRESIDENT FOR LIFE .
6.4 ELECTION MANAGEMENT IN CAMEROON
6.5 THE ROLE OF VOMA IN BALI NYONGA TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE
6.6 TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES AND MULTI-PARTY POLITICS IN CAMEROON
6.7 VOMA AND THE 2013 MUNICIPAL/LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN BALI .
6.8 ‘WRATH FROM THE GODS:’ ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
6.9 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER VII IN THE NAME OF INVESTITURE: CPDM PARTY DISCIPLINE IN MBANKOMO
7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.2 BACKGROUND
7.3 THE 2013 MUNICIPAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN CAMEROON
7.4 IN SEARCH OF ‘CONSENSUS’ AT MBANKOMO TOWN HALL
7.5 INVESTITURE SAGA IN MBANKOMO: CONTRASTING OPINIONS I
7.6 INVESTITURE SAGA IN MBANKOMO: CONTRASTING OPINIONS: II
7.7 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER VIII DECENTRALISATION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.2 BACKGROUND
8.3 PARTICIPATION
8.4 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN CAMEROON
8.5 DECENTRALISATION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION: EXPERIENCES FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH
8.6 MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN CAMEROON
8.7 MBANKOMO: REVENUE COLLECTION IN DISARRAY
8.8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
CHAPTER IX CONCLUSION: POLITICAL PROJECT AND POLICY BOOMERANG
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