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Table of contents
1 Introduction
2 Do firm motivations matter for CSR awareness?
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Literature review and hypotheses
2.2.1 Greenwashing
2.2.2 Defensive CSR
2.2.3 Pro-social CSR
2.2.4 Strategic CSR
2.3 Data
2.3.1 The EnDD survey
2.3.2 CSR motivations
2.3.3 CSR awareness indexes
2.3.4 Controls
2.4 Empirical analysis and results
2.4.1 What are the determinants of CSR motivation?
2.4.2 Are firms claiming to do some CSR actions more likely to be aware of CSR issues?
2.4.3 Is there a link between CSR motivation and CSR awareness intensity?
2.5 Robustness checks
2.5.1 Soft and hard practices
2.5.2 Weighted awareness indexes
2.5.3 The three-level CSR awareness indexes
2.6 Conclusion
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 EnDD Survey
2.7.2 Variables
2.7.3 Complementary descriptive statistics and empirical results
3 Board independence and the monitoring-advising trade-off
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Basic set up
3.2.1 Overview
3.2.2 Contractual variables
3.3 The governance and productive stages
3.3.1 The governance stage
3.3.2 The production stage
3.4 Equilibrium
3.4.1 The trade-off between monitoring and advising boards
3.4.2 Monitoring boards with low expertise level
3.4.3 Board’s decision
3.4.4 Shareholders’ decision
3.4.5 Incentive compatibility constraints
3.5 The relationship between board characteristics and monitoring boards
3.5.1 Proposition 1. Expertise and monitoring boards
3.5.2 Proposition 2. The cost of monitoring board in terms of advising quality
3.5.3 Proposition 3. Advising boards and CEO’s private benefit
3.5.4 Proposition 4. The cleansing effect of expertise
Contents
3.6 Conclusion
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Description of the productive stage
3.7.2 Proofs
4 Independent directors: Less informed, but better selected than affiliated directors?
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Literature review and hypotheses
4.2.1 Board functioning and the informational gap
4.2.2 Director selection and heterogeneity
4.3 Identification strategy
4.3.1 General approach
4.3.2 Independent position and the informational gap
4.3.3 Director fixed effects and selection
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Sample selection
4.4.2 Director, board and firm characteristics
4.4.3 Selection bias
4.5 Empirical results
4.5.1 Independence position and the informational gap
4.5.2 Independent directors’ selection
4.6 Endogeneity issues
4.7 Conclusion
4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Variables
4.8.2 The French elite social network
4.8.3 Selection bias
4.8.4 Robustness checks for independent position
4.8.5 Robustness checks for director fixed effects analysis
5 The representation of managers, shareholders and stakeholders inside the boardroom: Does it Matter for CSR commitment?
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Literature review and hypotheses
5.2.1 The CEO’s opportunistic behavior hypothesis
5.2.2 The stakeholders’ conflicts resolution hypothesis
5.3 Data and methods
5.3.1 Board variables
5.3.2 CSR commitment indexes
5.3.3 Control variables
5.3.4 Methods
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Bivariate analysis
5.4.2 The shareholder perspective on the link between CSR commitment and board composition
5.4.3 The stakeholder perspective on the link between CSR commitment and board composition
5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 Robustness checks
5.5.2 Endogeneity issues
5.6 Conclusion
5.7 Appendix
5.7.1 Variables
5.7.2 Sample descriptive statistics
5.7.3 Extra-financial data
5.7.4 Robustness checks
6 Gender quota inside the boardroom: Female directors as new key players?
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Literature review
6.2.1 Diversity and governance
6.2.2 The effects of a gender quota
6.2.3 The determinants of director fees
6.3 Who is entering the boardroom?
6.3.1 Seasoned or unseasoned directors?
6.3.2 The pool of directors
6.3.3 The pool of directorships
6.4 What do they do inside the boardroom?
6.5 What do they earn?
6.5.1 The determinants of director fees
6.5.2 Why do female directors fail to be the new key players?
6.6 Conclusion
6.7 Appendix
6.7.1 Variables
6.7.2 Gender policy in Europe
6.7.3 The French elite network
6.7.4 Trend in directors’ fees over the 2006-2014 period
7 Conclusion
