Credibility of self-reported voting intentions

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Table of contents

1 Texting Parents about Early Child Development : Behavioral Changes and Unintended Social Effects 
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Intervention, Study Design and Data
1.2.1 Experimental Design
1.2.2 Incentives and Compliance
1.2.3 Data
1.2.4 Balance and Attrition
1.3 Empirical Specification
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Direct effects of text message intervention
1.4.2 Impact of opinion leaders’ exposure to text message intervention
1.5 Mechanisms
1.5.1 Confusion
1.5.2 Boycott
1.5.3 Crowding out
1.6 Concluding remarks
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Supplementary tables
1.7.2 Lasso prediction of quiz participation
2 Facts, Alternative Facts, and Fact Checking in Times of Post-Truth Politics 
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Related literature
2.3 Experimental design
2.3.1 Context
2.3.2 Facts and alternative facts
2.3.3 Setup of the experiment
2.3.4 Sample, balance across treatments and descriptive statistics
2.3.5 Variables
2.3.5.1 Voting intentions
2.3.5.2 Past election outcomes
2.3.5.3 Prior knowledge
2.4 Results
2.4.1 The average treatment effect
2.4.2 Heterogeneity with respect to the prior knowledge
2.4.3 Interpretation
2.4.3.1 Nonlinearities in mapping facts to votes
2.4.3.2 Experimenter demand effects
2.4.3.3 Signal about the candidate
2.4.3.4 Salience
2.5 Additional results
2.5.1 Credibility of self-reported voting intentions
2.5.1.1 Evidence from the dictator games
2.5.1.2 Evidence from the list experiments
2.5.2 Heterogeneity with respect to other observables
2.6 Concluding remarks
3 Political influence on homicide reports under civil conflict 
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Elections and conflict persistence in the literature
3.3 Context: The Colombian conflict and elections
3.4 Effect of close electoral outcomes on murders
3.4.1 Econometric framework
3.4.2 Data
3.4.3 Testing Assumptions
3.4.4 Graphical analysis
3.4.5 Results
3.4.6 Placebo tests
3.4.7 Robustness checks
3.5 Mechanisms
3.5.1 Reaction
3.5.2 Reporting biases
3.5.2.1 From unknown perpetrator to guerrillas
3.5.2.2 A benchmark data source
3.5.2.3 Subgroup analysis of municipalities with false positive cases
3.5.2.4 Subgroup analysis of official figures for false positive municipalities
3.5.2.5 Overcount of coalition vs undercount of opposition
3.5.3 Anecdotal evidence
3.6 Concluding remarks
3.7 Appendix