International Environmental Agreement : Asymmetric Information

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Table of contents

1 The Law of One Carbon Price 
1.1 The Model and some Relevant Benchmarks
1.2 Domestic Regulation under Asymmetric Information
1.2.1 Domestic Incentive-Feasibility
1.2.2 Equilibrium Characterization
1.3 International Environmental Agreement: Information Sharing
1.3.1 Domestic Incentive-Feasibility
1.3.2 Optimal International Environmental Agreement
1.4 International Environmental Agreement: Asymmetric Information
1.4.1 Domestic Incentive-Feasibility under Asymmetric Information 
1.4.2 International Incentive-Feasibility under Asymmetric Information 
1.5 Conclusion
1.6 Appendix
2 Third-Party Certification and Price Signaling 
2.1 Model and Benchmarks
2.1.1 Full information equilibrium
2.1.2 Signaling equilibrium
2.2 Signaling versus exogenous costly disclosure
2.3 Signaling versus endogenous certification with two quality levels
2.3.1 Set of incentive-feasible contracts
2.3.2 Existence of an incentive-feasible contract and audit costs
2.3.3 For-profit certifier
2.3.4 Industry certifier
2.4 Extension: certifier as a standard setter
2.5 Conclusion
2.6 Appendix
3 The Two Middlemen 
3.1 Model and benchmarks
3.1.1 Full information equilibrium
3.1.2 Separating signaling equilibrium
3.1.3 Exogenous disclosure
3.2 Endogenous disclosure with one middleman
3.2.1 For-profit middleman
3.2.2 Industry middleman
3.3 Endogenous disclosure with two middlemen
3.3.1 For-profit label owner
3.3.2 Industry label owner
3.3.3 Potential extensions with a monopoly
3.4 Extension Duopoly.
3.4.1 Exogenous disclosure
3.4.2 Separating signaling equilibrium
3.4.3 Comparison of the realized profits in the two equilibrium
3.5 Conclusion
3.6 Appendix
References