Measure of eligibility criterion

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Table of contents

General Introduction 
0.1 Contribution and outline of the dissertation
0.2 Chapter 1 : Subsidizing Adjustment Or Wages ? Evidence From A Hiring Credit In France
0.3 Chapter 2 : Termination of Employment Contracts by Mutual Consent and Labor Market Fluidity
0.4 Chapter 3 : Labor Market Concentration and Stayers’ Wages : Evidence from France
0.5 Chapter 4 : Rival Guests or Defiant Hosts ? The Economic impact of Hosting Refugee
0.6 Conclusion
1 Subsidizing Adjustments Or Wages ? Evidence From a Hiring Credit In France 
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Context
1.3 Data
1.3.1 DADS
1.3.2 EMMO
1.3.3 Monitoring file of Pôle Emploi
1.4 Descriptive statistics
1.5 Econometric analysis
1.5.1 Methodology
1.5.2 Results
1.5.3 Discussion
1.6 Robustness tests
1.6.1 Selection in the sample
1.6.2 Placebo tests
1.6.3 Randomization inference
1.7 Conclusion
1.A Measure of eligibility criterion
1.B Use of the hiring credit
1.C Selection in the EMMO sample
1.D Anticipations
2 Termination of Employment Contracts by Mutual Consent and Labor Market Fluidity 
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Institutional context
2.2.1 Institutional context before 2008
2.2.2 The 2008 reform
2.3 Potential effects of the reform : a conceptual framework
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Terminations by agreement and establishments’ survival
2.5 Terminations by agreement and establishments’ exit flows : a graphical analysis .
2.5.1 Terminations by agreement as a substitute for other forms of terminations .
2.5.2 Terminations by agreement and overall separation rates
2.6 Regressions analysis
2.6.1 Regression results
2.6.2 An augmented specification
2.6.3 Interaction between the timing of the reform and the one of the crisis
2.7 Termination by agreement and worker mobility
2.8 Conclusion
2.A Figures and Tables
2.B Conceptual Framework
2.B.1 Technology and adjustment costs
2.B.2 First-order conditions and state variables
2.B.3 Pre-reform optimal strategies
2.B.4 After the reform
2.C A “stacked” difference-in-difference approach
3 Labor Market Concentration and Stayers’ Wages : Evidence from France 
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Literature review
3.2.1 Modern Monopsony
3.2.2 New classical Monopsony
3.3 Empirical specification
3.3.1 Labor market concentration
3.3.2 Labor market concentration and wages
3.4 Data
3.5 Main results
3.6 Secondary results
3.6.1 Selection into the stayer status
3.6.2 Heterogeneity
3.7 Conclusion
3.A Not for publication or for online publication only
4 Rival Guests or Defiant Hosts ? The Local Economic Impact of Hosting Refugees
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Context and Data
4.2.1 Humanitarian migrants and housing centers in France
4.2.2 Data
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Econometric model
4.3.2 Identification Hypothesis
4.4 Results
4.4.1 The mobility response of natives
4.4.2 Economic consequences of native avoidance
4.5 Estimating the aggregate welfare cost of refugee center openings
4.6 Conclusion
4.A Alternative channels
Appendix
4.A.1 Local Labor market
4.A.2 Criminality
4.B Refugees and housing centers
4.B.1 Humanitarian migrants in France
4.B.2 Refugee centers openings
4.B.3 Refugee centers in the press
4.C Definition of population
4.D Matching
4.E Spillover effect
4.E.1 Identification
4.E.2 Estimation
4.F Main types of crime and misdemeanour
4.G Another amenity shock : day-care centers closures
4.H Other matching algorithms
4.I Local tax rates
4.J Identification problem