(Downloads - 0)
For more info about our services contact : help@bestpfe.com
Table of contents
1 Whispers in Networks
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Related Literature
1.2 The Baseline Model
1.2.1 Players, payoffs and communication technology
1.2.2 Conversation in Trees
1.3 Conversation in a simultaneous game
1.4 Conversation in a sequential game
1.5 Cycles
1.5.1 Two Channels
1.5.2 Unique Channel
1.6 Conclusion
1.7 Appendix: Proofs
1.7.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
1.7.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
1.7.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3
1.7.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4
1.7.5 Proof of Proposition 1.5
2 Endogenous Institutions: a network experiment in Nepal
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Related Literature
2.2 Experiment
2.2.1 Networks and Data
2.2.2 Monitors and Game Overview
2.2.3 Experimental Context
2.2.4 Design
2.3 The Framework
2.3.1 Types
2.3.2 Timing, Actions and Payoffs
2.3.3 Equilibrium
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Preliminary Findings and Possible Limitations
2.4.2 Statistical Estimation
2.4.2.1 Impact of Group Composition on Monitor Voting
2.4.2.2 Impact of Different Exogenous Monitoring
2.4.2.3 Impact of Endogenous v/s Exogenous Monitoring
2.4.2.4 Impact of Order of Endogenous/Exogenous
2.5 Conclusion
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Figures
2.6.2 Tables
2.6.3 Experiment Instructions
2.6.4 Summary Statistics
2.6.5 Monitor Choice
2.6.6 Model with Three Agents
2.6.6.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
2.6.6.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
2.6.6.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
3 Delegating Conflict
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Related Literature
3.2 The Baseline Model
3.2.1 Players, actions and payoffs
3.2.2 Equilibrium
3.2.3 Comparative statics
3.3 Contracts: Complete Information
3.4 Incomplete Information
3.4.1 Incomplete information on the opposing militia’s ideology
3.4.2 Incomplete information on the ideology of both militias: second best contracts
3.5 Conclusion
3.6 Appendix: Proofs
3.6.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
3.6.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
3.6.4 Proof of Proposition 3.5
3.6.5 Proof of Proposition 3.6
3.6.6 Proof of Proposition 3.7
3.6.7 Proof of Proposition 3.8
4 Hiring Guns: Strategic Delegation and Common Agency
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Related Literature
4.2 Strategic Delegation of War
4.2.1 Players, actions and types
4.2.2 The game
4.2.3 Results
4.3 Competing for a Common Militia
4.3.1 Setting and governments’ programs
4.3.2 Optimization
4.3.3 Results
4.4 Conclusion
4.5 Appendix: Proofs
4.5.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
4.5.2 Proof of Proposition 4.1
4.5.3 Proof of Lemma 4.2
4.5.4 Proof of Lemma 4.3
4.5.5 Corollary
4.5.5.1 Proof of Corollary
4.5.6 Proof of Proposition 4.2
4.5.7 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Bibliography
