Morality and moral judgment

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Table of contents

Introduction 
0.1 The traditional economic analysis of tax evasion
0.1.1 Economic analysis of crime
0.1.2 Economic analysis of tax evasion
0.1.3 An addition of Yitzhaki
0.2 Methodological approach of conceiving a TEG
0.2.1 Scrutiny of behavior and anonymity of participants
0.2.2 Context of the experiment
0.2.2.1 Neutral vs loaded frame
0.2.2.2 On the way to ask for compliance
0.2.2.3 Origin of income: earned vs windfall income
0.2.2.4 Nature of income: self-employed vs salaried job
0.2.2.5 Redistribution to participants
0.2.2.6 Public good fund
0.2.3 Size of stake
0.2.4 Students are a valid pool of subjects
0.2.5 Temporal limitation
0.2.6 The decision task in a TEG is a valid measure of tax behavior
0.3 The impact of traditional deterrent variables on lab tax compliance
0.3.1 Tax rate
0.3.2 Audit probability
0.3.3 Fine size
0.3.4 From traditional deterrent variables to non-monetary incentives to comply
0.4 Alternative sources of tax compliance
0.4.1 Personality traits
0.4.1.1 Definitions and examples
0.4.1.2 When does personality vary?
0.4.1.3 Does (stable) personality traits really exist?
0.4.2 Context
0.4.2.1 Framing
0.4.2.2 Priming
0.4.2.3 Commitment
0.5 How are context and personality traits integrated into the analysis of tax evasion?
1 Does tax morale really exist? A psychometric investigation 
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Foundations of tax morale from moral psychology
1.2.1 Morality and moral emotions
1.2.2 Morality and moral judgment
1.3 Experiment 1
1.3.1 Design of the experiment
1.3.1.1 Psychometric measures of moral emotions
1.3.1.2 Experimental procedure
1.3.2 Results
1.3.2.1 Compliance behavior and morality
1.3.2.2 Multivariate analysis
1.3.2.3 Using Principal Component Analysis to combine sub-scales
1.4 Experiment 2
1.4.1 Design of the experiment
1.4.1.1 Psychometric measures of moral judgments
1.4.1.2 Experimental procedure
1.4.2 Results
1.4.2.1 Compliance behavior and morality
1.4.2.2 Multivariate analysis
1.4.2.3 Using Principal Component Analysis to combine sub-scales
1.5 Conclusion
2 Tax evasion under Oath 
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Fighting dishonesty with commitment
2.3 Experiment 1
2.3.1 Design of the experiment
2.3.2 Experimental treatment
2.3.3 Experimental procedure
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics
2.4.2 Income declaration: the impact of individual variables
2.4.3 Income declaration: the oath impact
2.5 Experiment 2
2.5.1 Design of the experiment
2.5.2 Experimental procedure
2.5.3 Descriptive statistics
2.5.4 Income declaration: the oath impact
2.5.5 Compliance under oath: light on the polarization effect
2.6 Conclusion
3 Disentangling commitment from social effect in a voting experiment on tax funds 
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Why should voting increase compliance?
3.3 Design of the experiment
3.3.1 Experimental protocol
3.3.2 Avoiding selection effect
3.3.3 Experimental treatments
3.3.4 Experimental procedure
3.4 Comparison of treatments and participants
3.4.1 Participants are globally comparable between treatment
3.4.2 Participants make the same decisions in each treatment
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics
3.5.2 Direct democracy effect disappears when taking into account the selection
3.5.3 A commitment effect is found but no social effect
3.5.3.1 In the full sample
3.5.3.2 In the truncated sample: keeping people who vary their declarations
3.5.4 Are other variables influencing compliance?
3.5.4.1 Questionnaires’ answers are rather different
3.5.4.2 Perceived legitimacy, fairness and importance of the selection: their impact on compliance
3.6 Conclusion
Conclusion