Over-provision of treatment at the extensive margin and rationing in health care

For more info about our services contact : help@bestpfe.com

Table of contents

Introduction – Résumé Substantiel en Français
General Introduction
0.1 Context
0.2 Patient’s demand and quality standards of health care
0.3 Patients heterogeneity and allocative efficiency of care
0.3.1 Allocative efficiency at the intensive and extensive margins
0.3.2 Refinement of DRG classification and health-provider’s procedure selection
0.4 Universal obligation of services and providers status in health care
0.5 Outline of the dissertation
1 Hospital Competition: Treatment Decisions and Coverage of Care
1 Introduction
2 Framework
2.1 Efficient allocation of treatment
2.2 Second best allocation of treatment
3 The impact of hospital competition on welfare
4 Extensions and empirical predictions
4.1 Hospital competition and global coverage
4.2 Different patients’ out-of-pocket participation
4.3 Testable predictions and concluding remarks
2 Incomplete Information and Economic Incentives in Health Care
1 Introduction
2 General framework
2.1 Setting : general structure
2.2 The efficient care procedures
2.3 Informational structure of diagnostic testing
3 Decentralization of care to a monopoly hospital
3.1 Monopoly regulation problem
3.2 Monopoly optimal payment schemes and implementation costs
3.3 Monopoly optimal care procedures
4 Decentralization of care to competitive hospitals
4.1 The competitive regulation problem
4.2 Competitive optimal payments
4.3 Competitive optimal treatment praxis
5 Hospitals’ commitment to cure patients
6 Concluding remarks
3 Mixed Market and Asymmetric Universal Service Obligations
1 Introduction
2 Framework
2.1 Model settings
2.2 Social optimum and limited coverage
2.3 Decentralization to a mixed duopoly
3 Mixed-duopoly equilibrium prices and coverage
3.1 Equilibrium prices and consumers’ segmentation
3.2 Equilibrium coverage
4 Impact of asymmetric USOs on equilibrium qualities
4.1 The firm with USOs provides the high quality qu ≥ qpr
4.2 The firm with USOs provides the low quality qu < qpr
5 Discussion and robustness
6 Concluding remarks
General Conclusion
List of Tables
List of Figures
Abstracts