Social choice of environmental quality

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Table of contents

I Tax Avoidance 
1 Free-riding on environmental taxation 
1.1 Introduction
1.2 The model
1.3 Second-best optimal tax
1.4 The two-part tax schedule
1.5 The example of BHPP
1.6 Discussion on the modelling choice of avoidance function
1.7 Conclusion
1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 La¤er curve
1.8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
1.8.3 First-order condition for welfare maximization
1.8.4 Proof of Lemma 4
II Environmental regulation under asymmetric information 
2 Environmental regulation with price signaling 
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The model
2.3 Asymmetric information
2.3.1 Separating equilibrium
2.3.2 Pooling equilibrium
2.4 Environmental regulation
2.4.1 Environmental taxation
2.5 Welfare implications
2.6 Conclusion & discussion
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Derivation of signalling price
2.7.2 Consumers entirely internalize the pollution externality
2.7.3 The choice of optimal pricing
2.7.4 Proof of Corollary 16: @t @ < 0
III Di¤erentiation in environmental quality 
3 Taste for diversity, pollution aversion and optimal choice of environmental quality 
Résumé du chapitre 3
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The model
3.3 Short-term choice of EQ
3.4 Social choice of environmental quality
3.5 Long-term private choice of environmental quality
3.6 Producers’organization with environmental awareness
3.7 Conclusion
3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 The sequence of the game
Conclusion Générale
General Conclusion
Bibliography