Some Comments About the (Non-)Existence of the H-solution

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Table of contents

A Generalization of the Harsanyi NTU Value to Games with Incomplete Information 
1 Introduction
2 Formulation
2.1 Bayesian Cooperative Game
2.2 Incentive Efciency and The Virtual Utility Approach
2.3 The M-solution
3 Motivating Examples
3.1 Example 1: A Collective Choice Problem
3.2 Example 2: A Bilateral Trade Problem
4 Equity Principles for Bayesian Cooperative Games
5 Optimal Threats
6 The H-Solution
6.1 Example 1
6.2 Example 2
7 Some Comments About the (Non-)Existence of the H-solution
7.1 Example 3: Non-existence of the H-solution
7.2 Free Disposal and the Structure of Incentives
8 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
On the Values for Bayesian Cooperative Games with Sidepayments 
1 Introduction
2 Bayesian Cooperative Game
3 Incentive Efciency and Virtual Utility
4 Values for Bayesian Cooperative Games with Orthogonal Coalitions
4.1 The M-Solution
4.2 The H-Solution
4.3 Reconciling the Differences
5 Values for Two-person Bayesian Games
xii Incentives in Cooperation and Communication
The Value of Mediated Communication 
1 Introduction
2 Motivating Example
3 Basic Game
4 Mediated Persuasion
4.1 Mediated Persuasion Under Veriable Information
4.2 The Virtual Persuasion Game
4.3 Optimal Mediators
4.4 Extreme Communication Equilibria and the Number of Signals
5 Discussions
5.1 Cheap-Talk Implementation
5.2 Information Design Problems
Bibliography