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LATENT GROUPS AND PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS
Falaschetti (2003) concurred that high voter turnout constituencies can influence policy – as reflected in increased government spending. Searching for other effects on policy as it relates to government spending, Falaschetti queried whether underlying [latent] forces – institutions, groups of voters, or special interest groups – might influence policy making as well. Additionally, Olson (1991) considered electoral constituencies to be latent, arguing that such diffuse groups cannot influence public policy decision making, due to “free riding” tendencies of group members.
In that instance, the policy used was telecommunications policy across U.S. states – i.e., policies that favour residential customers, as government regulated the telecommunications industry. A key question was: can electoral constituencies as a collective influence policymaking? After reading Falaschetti’s opening discussion where there is mention of Olson (1991) on collectivism and as Falaschetti referred to Fleck on high voter turnout, there was inference that at times the constituency [collective] was latent and at other times successful (not latent) in effecting policy decisions.
Recognising Fleck’s work as ex-post identification of constituencies overcoming problems associated with collective actions, Falaschetti desired to examine ex-ante conditions and factors that would facilitate constituencies’ ability to influence policy decisions as a collective. Notably, Falaschetti highlighted this (ex-post research approach) as a weakness in Fleck’s work and, by taking an ex-ante approach, endeavoured to build on if not improve on Fleck’s research. Telecommunications policy was thought to be an effective vehicle by which to examine electoral [constituency] effects, as users of residential telecommunications services were thought to be latent as a collective. This was in contrast to more organised interest groups – e.g., local exchange carriers or private sector telecommunications companies that actively lobbied to influence policy makers. Indeed, collective action theory recognises that organised groups (private sector lobbyist for example) exert disproportionate policy influence. With this in mind, characteristically in the U.S. there are many regional local exchanges carriers or telecommunications companies, and all purposefully attempt to influence public policy pertaining to telecommunications. It would then be expected that policies aimed at local exchange carriers would vary across electoral constituencies, states or jurisdictions and such policies would affect local service. Falaschetti, however, accepts that there is a greater propensity for latent constituencies to influence policy, all the while competing with organisational groups. The research, however, takes an ex-ante approach focusing on [other] formal institutions facilitating (so described) latent voters to act as a collective in an attempt to influence policy decision-making. Characteristically, a formal institution would be involved in activities such as voter registration, dissemination of voter information or facilitating same day registration and voting, thus enabling citizens (thought to be latent) to effectively mobilize on issues of importance – e.g., pricing policies that favour residential users of telecommunications services.
Empirical Model
Falaschetti presented a model where it was shown that variation in election institutions account for significant changes in (local telecommunications exchange) policy across U.S. states. Questioning Falaschetti’s work, a query is: Who exactly are these “election institutions?” Are they the electoral commission, for example, that administers the election process? Are they organized interest groups that in one instance pursue their own self interests through lobbying and in another instance influence electoral constituencies by reducing voter resource costs? One can only infer as to what is meant by election institutions in the absence of direct reference as to whom and what comprises such entities. Nevertheless, it was shown that variation in turnout had significant explanatory effect as well. In several regression equations, two policy alternatives (in separate calculations) were considered – see table 2.1. Notably, although no numbers are shown in table 2.1, it is shown to illustrate how data will be presented for analysis in chapter 5. In table 2.1, the first policy alternative, being a dependent variable, represented telecommunications users’ preference for SEPARATE local and long distance service providers, to this end resulting in lower and efficient allocation of costs. The second alternative pertains to policies that favour end-user LOCAL EXCHANGE PRICING (LEC_PRICE); such polices effect local service providers that provide both local and long distance telecommunications services. Interest groups preferred one or the other policy alternative and attempt to influence policy makers to, in the case of endusers, minimize pricing or, in the case of service providers, maximise price. Notably, Falaschetti presented two sets of regressions and each set included three calculations [regressions] testing for effects on a dependent variable. Again, in one set there were three calculations with the dependent variable being SEPARATE and in a second set the dependent variable being LOCAL EXCHANGE (LEC_PRICE} PRICING.
-Dedication
-Acknowledgements
-List of Figures
-List of Tables
-List of Appendices
-Definitions and Terms
-Abstract
-Bibliography
-Appendices
