HOGLUND’S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ON ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

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CHAPTER THREE: THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF POST-INDEPENDENCE NIGERIAN POLITICS

INTRODUCTION

In order to understand the link between electoral violence and the nature of politics in Nigeria, one needs to have a clear view of post-independence Nigeria, which has been influenced by how modern Nigeria was created. This necessitates a brief look at the process of amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates in 1914, the subsequent creation of a semi-autonomous federal system in 1946, and, lastly, independence in 1960. The democratic republic created in 1960 was cut short by military intervention in 1966 which extended up to 1979 when another democratic interlude was allowed (1979-1983). This was followed by another long military rule (1983-1999). In 1999, the military again transferred power to the civilians. This was followed by electoral violence in the 2003 and the 2007 elections. The violence did not, however, lead to another military takeover.

THE CREATION OF A SEMI-AUTONOMOUS FEDERAL SYSTEM IN NIGERIA (1914-1960)

The political entity known today as Nigeria is a product of British colonialism. It emerged as a result of the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates by Lord Lugard and the introduction of the Lugardian Constitution of 1914 (Mabongunje, 2014: 934). These two protectorates originally contained a multiplicity of ethno-cultural and state, systems, empires, kingdoms, chiefdoms, city-states, villages, and caliphates. Although there is no official tabulation of the size of ethnic groups in the country, there are 400 different languages in Nigeria (Anaita and Haruna, 1997: 149). This rough estimate is derived from reports on Nigeria‘s population, with each group identified by a distinctive political system with a few hundred people in large compact villages where kinship and dialect dominate political and social life (ERC, 2008: 81). Among various elements of pre-colonial societies in Nigeria, language appears to be the most significant. While language and family connections bind these societies together, emphasis was placed on leadership, performance and achievement. Elective principles are weak or perhaps non-existent. Although politically, socially and economically, ethnic groups in Nigeria are differentiated, it is however important to point out that these groups had strong connections among themselves prior to colonial rule.
Pre-colonial  Nigerian  societies  are  classified  into  two  categories:  ―mega‖  and  ―mini‖  states (Olukoju, 1997: 13). Mega states refer to empires and kingdoms established by communities before the advent of colonial rule. These include: Hausa and Kanuri of the North-West and North-East, Nupe of the North-central and Yoruba and Beni in South-West and Southern  regions. Mini states refer to groups without established political structures at the time of the arrival of the colonialists. Igbo of the South-East (apart from Onitsha and Aboh), Tiv and Gwari of the North-central, and Ibibio and Ijaw of South are included in this category (Olukoju, 1997: 13).
Initially, the Northern and the Southern protectorates were administered separately. This did not really change when the two protectorates were amalgamated in 1914 by Lugard as each remained virtually independent of the other (Jinadu, 2002: 13). The first attempt to bring the two together started with Sir Hugh Clifford, who replaced Lugard. This was through the introduction of the Clifford Constitution in 1922. It created a Legislative Council made of 46 members, 27 of whom were official members and 19 unofficial members. Official members included the Governor, members of the Executive Council, first class residents, as well as political secretaries of the Northern and the Southern protectorates as officials. Of the unofficial members, fifteen were nominated by the Governor and the four were elected from the Lagos colony and Western protectorate (ERC, 2008: 81-82). These included seven Europeans representing various interests from the chamber of commerce, shipping, banking and mining, and six indigenous Nigerians that included two emirs from the North, the Alaafin of Oyo, and one member each from Lagos, Calabar, and Binin-Warri (ERC, 2008: 82). The Council, however, had only an advisory role and met once a year to listen to the Governor General‘s broadcast on Nigeria‘s affairs. Laws for the Lagos colony and Southern protectorate were made by this council, while the Governor General continued to legislate for the Northern protectorate through proclamations.
An important element introduced by the 1922 constitution was the elective principle. Though of limited franchise, this was the first time Nigerians were given the opportunity to elect their representatives. Franchise to be elected was based on adult male suffrage (21 years old), residential qualification of at least one year, and a gross income of 100 pounds sterling per annum for Lagos and 20 pounds sterling per annum for Calabar (ERC, 2008: 82). While the Clifford constitution of 1922 can be commended for its elective principle, it still maintained the separation between the North and the South. The north did not undertake any elections.
The end of the Second World War (WWII) coincided with a growing struggle for independence and self-determination, with Nigerian nationalists calling for a new constitution. On March 6 1945, Governor Sir Arthur Richards presented proposals for a new constitution. This was adopted  in  1946  and  came  to  be  known  as  the  ―Richards  Constitution‖.  The  new  constitution provided a platform for ―unity in diversity‖ within separate regions and legislatures. It created a National Legislative Council known as the House of Representatives. The House had 45 members, 28 of whom were Nigerians (four of the 28 were elected and the remaining 24 nominated). It also established three regional assemblies. Although members of the regional assemblies were nominated, they constituted an electoral college for election of members to the central legislature (House of Representatives). The eastern regional assembly was unicameral while the northern and western assemblies were bicameral, including the house of chiefs and the House of Assembly. The regional assemblies had no legislative powers but acted as advisory bodies to the governor, who was not bound to accept their recommendations (Mabongunje, 2014: 934). The division of Nigeria into three regions by the British in 1946 was aimed at granting self- rule to the three geo-political zones while leaving them in control of the centre. Richard‘s constitution was rejected by Nigerian nationalists because of the unilateral manner in which its proposals were conceived and adopted. This in part led to the replacement of Richards by Macpherson as Governor General of Nigeria in 1948 (Mabongunje, 2014: 936).
The tripartite structure created under Richards‘s constitution, however, was retained until 1951. On 9 January 1950 a Grand National Conference (GNC) was organised in Ibadan to discuss the draft of the new constitution (Ihonvbere and Shaw, 1998: 20-21). It was at this conference that delegates   requested   different   levels   of   autonomy   such   as   regional   self-rule   and the ‘Nigerianisation‘ of the public service, leading to a quasi-federal arrangement. The new constitution, known as the Macpherson constitution, provided for a central legislature and central executive council. The legislative arm, known as the House of Representatives, consisted of the president, six ex-officio members, 136 representative members elected from the regional Houses, and 6 special members appointed by the governor to represent interest and communities that were inadequately represented. The constitution also provided for regional legislatures and regional executives. In the North and the West, the regional legislatures remained bicameral (made up of two chambers known as House of Chiefs and the House of Assembly), but in the East there was only one chamber: the House of Assembly. It is important to note that the power of the central legislature was unlimited and it could legislate on any matter, including those on which the regions had power to legislate (Iyayi, 2004: 5). While direct election into the central legislature took place in the eastern and western regions, members in the northern legislature were  nominated.  The  Macpherson  constitution  introduced  a  ―quasi-federal‖  political  structure with the following features:

  • The separation of Lagos from the western region;
  • The establishment of a federal government for Nigeria comprising three regions namely; north, east and west with the Governor General at the central government and three regional Governors;
  • The selection of central government ministers from among members of the regional legislatures.
  • The introduction of an exclusive list of responsibilities for both the federal and regional government;
  • The regionalisation of the judiciary and of the public service through the establishment of regional public service commissions, in addition to the federal

The processes of constitution-making continued at the constitutional conference in London in 1953 and in Lagos in 1954. The end result was the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution, named after Sir Oliver Lyttleton. The Constitution established a Federal Council of Ministers comprising of the Governor-General and three ministers from each region, a Federal House of Representatives consisting 184 members (92 from the Northern Region, 42 each from Western and Eastern Regions, Six from Southern Cameroon, and two from Lagos). At the regional level, governors were replaced by premiers and elected assemblies as a move towards regional self-government. The East and West attained self-government in 1957 and the North in 1959. This was a period of rapid changes with the nationalists demanding full independence. This was clear at the London Constitutional Conference in 1957 and in Lagos in 1958. These produced the 1959 Independence Constitution for Nigeria.
It was under the 1959 constitution that the 1959 general elections were held with the aim of creating a national federal government while still maintaining the same autonomous regions. Nigeria attained independence from Britain in October 1960 and became a republic in 1963. Part of the problems that Nigeria experienced post-independence stem from its failure to manage the relationship between the central government and the semi-autonomous regions. Undermining this relationship was the unequal size and population which translated to unequal representation at the centre, giving rise to various fears and uncertainties within and between the regions. Table 3.1 provides the size and 1959 population characteristics of the regions while Table 3.2 provides the allocation of national assembly seats by region and how the various parties performed in the 1959 elections.
The federation was dominated by the Northern Region with 75 per cent of the land mass and 54 per cent of the population (Appendex 2A). The other two regions were almost equal in size with around 12 per cent of the land mass, even though the east had a slightly higher population at 25 per cent to the west‘s 19 per cent. Each region was dominated by a specific ethnic group: Hausa- Fulani in the North, Yoruba in the West, and Igbo in the East. The regional demographic disparities were translated into representation disparities at the federal legislative level. The North was allocated 174 seats, with the East having 73 seats and, the West 65 seats. This translated into northern dominance of the federal legislature which translated into northern control of the federal government. Another important feature of the time was the existence of dominant regional parties. The Northern People‘s Congress (NPC) dominating the north, winning 77 percent (134 out of 174), of the regional seats which in the final analysis translated into 42.9 per cent of the federal legislature, allowing it to form the independence government in 1960. It had no following in the rest of the country, however. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) dominated the East taking 80 per cent of the seats (58 out of 73). It had some following in the west where it obtained 35 per cent of the seats (23 out of 65) but with no support in the north. The Action Group (AG) dominated the western region, obtaining 52 per cent of the votes that translated into 34 seats out of 65. It is only this party that had some form of national support, receiving 14 per cent of the votes in the north (25 seats) and 19 per cent in the East (14 seats) (Jinadu, 2002: 17). Alhaji Tafawa Belewa of the NPC became the Prime Minister in 1960, despite the fact that his party had received only 26.7 per cent of the total votes cast. The ethnic regional divide and unequal federal structure remained one of the major challenges that the post-colonial Nigerian state had to confront (Diamond, 1988: 57). This contributed to intense political rivalries for the control of the centre, including that of the regions. This rivalry was to play itself out over the issue of population in the Nigeria‘s first short-lived republic as discussed in the next section.

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NIGERIA‘S FIRST REPUBLIC 1960-1966

As previously stated Nigeria gained independence in October 1960 and became a Republic in October 1963. The elections in 1959 and the subsequent northern dominance of the federal government were based on the population size of the north. It was critical to all the political parties that a proper population census be carried out immediately after independence. The census results released in 1962 showed that the combined population of the west and the east regions was higher than the north. According to Diamond (1988: 133), figures received by the Eastern and Western regions indicate an increase over 70 per cent while the increase in the population of the North was just above 33 percent. This called for changes in the regional representations in favour of the two regions. The census results were rejected by the northern- controlled federal government which forced a recount in 1963. The final results came out just prior to the 1964 federal legislative elections. These indicated that the North had 55 per cent of the population and hence still deserved the same legislative seats, which meant continued control of the federal government. The census issue caused an alignment among the major political parties as they sought control of the federal government. The alignment was cantered on:

    • The Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), which was under the control of the Northern People‘s Congress – the current government in power, supported by the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and the Mid-west Democratic Front (MDF).
    • The United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), which brought together the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), the remnants of the Action Group, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) (Anifowose, 1982: 61). The NNA alliance used the Yoruba fears of the possible Igbo domination of the federal government to gain the western region‘s support, while the UPGA tried to gain the support of minority groups by proposing the creation of a sufficient number of states in each region so that none of the major ethnic groups could dominate (Iyayi, 2004: 7).

The campaign and actual conduct of the December 1964 elections were in many instances flawed. Ademoyega (1981: 19) notes the fact that 67 NPC candidates were declared elected unopposed before the elections. This was possible because the NPC government made it impossible for opposition candidates, mostly from the UPGA, to file their nomination papers. When a call was made by the UPGA to postpone the elections, it was ignored by the federal government. The UPGA ensured that no elections took place in the eastern region. The effect of the boycott could be seen from the low number of actual voters. This went from 7,189,797 in 1959 to 5,761,481 in 1964. The NPC was thus able to retain control of the federal government as indicated by the 1964 election results in Table 3.3. The NPC obtained 37.6 percent of the votes and 162 seats whilst its ally, the NNDP, obtained 15.1 percent of the votes and 36 seats. The two together controlled 52.7 percent of the votes and 198 seats out of 312.

Acknowledgements.
Dedications
Abbreviations
Abstract
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH THEME
1.2 DEFINING ELECTORAL PROCESS AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE
1.3 Electoral Process
1.4 Electoral Violence
1.4.1 Faulty electoral systems
1.4.2 The use and misuse of the state institutions by the incumbent president
1.4.3 Political parties
2 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY.
2.1 STUDY METHODOLOGY
2.2 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY.
CHAPTER TWO: HOGLUND’S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ON ELECTORAL VIOLENCE
2.1 INTRODUCTION.
2.2 THE NATURE OF POLITICS
2.2.1 Patrimonial rule
2.2.2 Conflict-cleavages
2.2.3 Culture of impunity
2.3 NATURE OF ELECTIONS
2.3.1 Competiveness
2.3.2 Political mobilisation
2.3.3 Close races
2.3.4 Stakes of electoral competition
2.3.5 Exposure to attacks
2.4 ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS
2.4.1 Electoral systems
2.4.2 Electoral management body
2.4.3 Models for electoral management.
2.4.4 Elections monitoring and observation
2.4.5 Regulations on the conduct of elections
2.4.6 Political parties
2.5 CONCLUSION.
CHAPTER THREE:THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF POST- INDEPENDENCE NIGERIAN POLITICS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.2 THE CREATION OF A SEMI-AUTONOMOUS FEDERAL SYSTEM IN NIGERIA (1914-1960).
3.3 NIGERIA‘S FIRST REPUBLIC 1960-1966
3.4 THE MILITARY INTERLUDE 1966-1979
3.5 THE SECOND REPUBLIC (1979-1983)
3.6 THE SECOND MILITARY RULE (1983-1999)
3.7 THE NATURE OF NIGERIAN POLITICS AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE
3.8 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER FOUR: THE NIGERIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.2 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER FIVE: NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.2 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER   SIX:    THE   NATURE,   PATTERN   AND   SPREAD OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN THE 2003 AND 2007 ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA
6.1 INTRODUCTION
6.2 THE PATTERN OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA
6.3 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER SEVEN: APPLICABILITY OF HOGLUND’S FRAMEWORK IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE 2003 AND 2007 ELECTION VIOLENCE
7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.2 CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDICES
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