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Table of contents
Introduction
Chapter 1 The Logic of Business Groups: A Moral Hazard Perspective
1.1. Introduction
1.2. Bailout or No Bailout ? The Icelandic Surprise
1.2.1 Hoping for Bailout: 2006-2010
1.2.2 Post 2010: The Case for No Bailout
1.2.3 Summary: Textual Evidence for Quasi-Natural Experiment
1.3. Data
1.3.1 Understanding Exogenous Shock Using Data
1.4 Testable Predictions
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Pooled OLS
1.5.3 Fixed effects
1.6 Robustness Checks
1.7 Interpretations, alternative explanations and conclusion
1.8 References
Chapter 2 Nature or Nurture? Revisiting the Gender Risk Aversion Difference in Corporate Finance
2.1 Introduction
2.2. Literature Review
2.3 Identification Strategy and Data
2.3.1. First born child as IV
2.3.2. Gender ratio as IV
2.3.3. Financial data
2.3.4. Instrumental Variables: Challenges
2.3.5 Instrumental Variables: Plan B
2.5 Identification Assumptions
2.6 Summary of Statistics
2.6.1 A Highly Gender Equal Sample
2.6.2 No observable gender difference in raw data
2.7 Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects and Probit Results
2.7.1 What we estimate
2.7.2 Samples
2.7.3 Pooled OLS Results
2.7.4 Probit Results
2.8 Instrumental Variables
2.8.1 Gender ratio is the only instrument that makes sense
2.8.2 IV Regressions
2.8.3 Robustness Checks
2.9 Conclusion
2.10 References
Chapter 3 The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at the failed Icelandic Banks
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Data
3.3 Wage distributions in the three banks 2004-2008
3.4 CEO Total Compensation
3.4.1 Short term incentive pay and performance targets
3.4.2 Stock Ownership and leveraged stock purchases of CEOs
3.5 Falsification of Equity through Incentive Pay
3.6 Conclusion
3.7 Bibliography
