THE MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS IN THE MAKING OF SWAZILAND’S INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

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Background

This thesis focuses on constitutional developments in the Kingdom of Swaziland from 1960 to 2005. 1960 marked the beginning of serious Independence Constitutional talks in colonial Swaziland, while 2005 saw the enactment of a new constitution in Swaziland after a 32 year period of constitutional void. The British bequeathed to Swaziland a governance document or a constitution which was a product of several meetings with Swazis. The term constitution has been defined by different scholars in different ways. On the one hand, Jan-Erik Lane defines a constitution as a compact document that encompasses a number of articles about a state, laying down rules which state activities are supposed to follow.1 According to this definition, a constitution is simply a list of instructions written in a document for a country. Lane further asserts that a constitution can be regarded as a single document that makes up the bulk of constitutional law.2 On the other hand, B. O. Nwabueze defines a constitution as a document that has a force of law by which a society organises government for itself and defines and limits its powers and prescribes the relations of its different organs.3 D.
Grimm describes the function of the constitution as follows: M. E. Akpan defines a constitution as a political contract between the government and the governed.5 Ndulo and Kent asserted that a constitution represents the basic structure of any organised society.6 These authors argued that a constitution can be written or unwritten, however concepts of formality appeared in post-colonial Africa. As a result, a constitution is now described as a single document, a charter for the exercise of political power.7 In essence, a constitution is that formal governance document that provides checks and balances on the powers of the state and defines the distribution and operation of power amongst the various components of the country.
T. Maseko8 emphasises that the constitution of a nation is not simply a statute which mechanically defines the structures of government. It is a ‘mirror reflecting the national soul’, the identification of ideals and aspirations of a nation, and the articulation of the values bonding its people and disciplining its government. A constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people constituting a government; a government without a constitution is power without right. A constitution is an account of the ways in which a people establish and limit the they govern themselves, in accordance with the ends and purposes that define their existence as a political community. This explains why the process of making a constitution is as important as the product and its observance.9power by which Constitution-making in Africa was an integral part of the decolonisation process that was ushered in by the Second World War (WW II). The factors that contributed to the rapid decline of the colonial empire in Africa and Asia after World War II need not delay us here.
Suffice it to state that the Atlantic Charter of 1941 drawn up by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill promised self-determination for all peoples at the end of World War II. The concept of self-government was taken by Africans to them also. A small African elite, who had acquired Western education and were familiar with the ideas of self-determination, rose to lead the struggles for independence. In 1957, Ghana gained independence under Kwame Nkrumah, followed by a string of other African countries in 1960. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan took note of these developments and made his 1960 speech about the unstoppable wind of change that was blowing across the African continent. In the same year the British started the process of establishing a constitution for Swaziland.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS :

  • Content Page
  • ABSTRACT
  • DEDICATION
  • ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • LIST OF ACRONYMS
  • LIST OF TABLES
  • LIST OF APPENDICES
  • CHAPTER ONE – GENERAL INTRODUCTION
    • Background
    • Literature Review
    • Statement of the Research Problem
    • Aims and Objectives of the Study
    • Significance of the Study
    • Research Methodology
    • Focus and Summary of Chapters
  • CHAPTER TWO – THE MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS IN THE MAKING OF SWAZILAND’S INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION
    • Introduction
    • The United Kingdom as Honest Broker?
    • The Swazi Monarchy and the Swazi National Council (SNC)
    • The White Community in Swaziland
    • The British Take-Over of Swaziland and the 1907 Partition Proclamation
    • Taxation Hike Crises and the Birth of the European Advisory Council (EAC)
    • The Swazi Modern Nationalists or the Radicals
    • The Republic of South Africa
    • Conclusion
  • CHAPTER THREE – FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLOCK 1960-
    • Introduction
    • Circumstances Leading to the Decolonisation of Swaziland
    • Containing the Decolonisation Whirlwind: South Africa, the Swazi Monarchy and the European
    • Advisory Council (EAC)
    • Stakeholders’ Public Positions on the Future Constitution of Swaziland
    • The European Advisory Council Call for a Legislative Council
    • The Ngwenyama’s April 1960 Constitutional Proposal
    • The Progressives’ Stance
    • The Galvanising Impact of the ‘Wind of Change” Discourse
    • The British Colonial Office and the Methodology of Decolonisation
    • Swaziland’s Maiden Constitutional Committee and the Commencement of Constitutional
    • Talks
    • Constitutional Committee Deliberations
    • The 1961 EAC/SNC Delegation to London
    • Public Reactions to the EAC/SNC Constitutional Proposal
    • The Looming Prospects of an Imposed Constitution
    • The Lancaster House Constitutional Conference on Swaziland 28 January to12 February
    • Choosing Delegates for the Lancaster House
    • Back to Swaziland: The Struggle Continues
    • Conclusion
  • CHAPTER FOUR – THE 1963 CONSTITUTION AND SWAZILAND’S FIRST LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
    • Introduction
    • Towards the Imposed 1963 Constitution for Swaziland
    • The Reactions of the Key Players to the Constitution
    • King Sobhuza and the Swazi National Council
    • Todd and the European Advisory Council
    • White Interest Groups
    • The Radical Political Party Leaders
    • Apartheid South Africa
    • The June 1964 Elections and the Establishment of Swaziland’s First Legislative and Executive
    • Council
    • The Imbokodvo-USA Coalition in the June 1964 Elections
    • From Swaziland’s First Legislative and Executive Council to the Constitutional Committee for
    • Constitutional Review
    • Conclusion
  • CHAPTER FIVE – THE 1967 CONSTITUTION, INTERNAL SELF GOVERNMENT AND THE 1968 INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION
    • Introduction
    • The Constitutional Review Committee and the Making of the 1967 Constitution
    • The Acrimonious Race Question during the April Legislative Council Debates
    • The March 1967 Constitution
    • From the April 1967 Elections to the Introduction of Internal Self-Government for
    • Swaziland
    • Towards the 1968 London Constitutional Conference
    • Conclusion
  • CHAPTER SIX – FROM THE WESTMINSTER CONSTITUTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL VOID IN SWAZILAND 1968-
    • Introduction
    • The Era of the Swazi-type Constitutional Monarchy 1968-
    • The Road to the End of Swaziland’s Era of Constitutional Monarchism
    • The May 1972 General Elections and the Conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary
    • The Bhekindlela Thomas Ngwenya Affair, the Citizenship Crisis and the Verdict of the Courts
    • The Sobhuza II 12 April 1973 Auto-Coup d’état and the Death of Constitutionalism
    • Governance in a Constitutional Void with Royal Decrees,Orders-in-Council 1973-
    • What is traditional about Tinkhundla?
    • The Tinkhundla Driven Elections into Parliament
    • The Bicameral House of Parliament
    • The Cabinet and Royal Absolutism
    • Elections Under the 1978 Tinkhundla System and the Extra-Constitutional Legislatures and Cabinet
    • Selection Procedure of Members of the Electoral College
    • The Paradox of the Co-Existence of elected Legislative and Executive Organs of Government from 1978 and the Continuity of Decrees and Orders-in-Council to
    • Conclusion
  • CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION
    • APPENDICES
    • BIBLIOGRAPHY

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